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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for paramilitary groups
12 results foundAuthor: Barria Issa, Cecar A. Title: The Use of Terrorism by Drug Trafficking Organizations' Paramilitary Groups in Mexico Summary: "In the early 1990s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) created their own military arms that later evolved into sophisticated paramilitary groups, now engaged in an all-out war against the state and/or anyone who represents an obstacle for their criminal activities. Furthermore, they are not hesitating to use tactics of extreme violence as terrorism to psychologically impact their enemies and those civilians not supporting them. Historically, terrorism related to drugs is new in Mexico but not in Latin America. The illegal drug trade has funded terrorist groups in Peru and Colombia, empowered criminal organizations and caused them to challenge the state's authority. An objective comparison of these cases can teach important lessons and show new paths to follow in the solution of Mexico's costly conflict. This thesis will define: How, where and why are DTO's paramilitary groups opting for terrorism in Mexico. It will outline the proper mechanisms to counter that terrorism. There is a long way to go to win the war on drugs in Mexico, but in order to apply new long term, less direct, and more social-based strategies, it is urgent for the state to set the proper security conditions in the short term." Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Theses: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Shelf Number: 120810 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Illegal TradeParamilitary GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Title: Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia's 2011 Elections Summary: Deeply entrenched connections between criminal and political actors are a major obstacle to conflict resolution in Colombia. Illegal armed groups seek to consolidate and expand their holds over local governments in the October 2011 governorship, mayoral, departmental assembly and municipal council elections. The national government appears more willing and better prepared than in the past to curb the influence of illegal actors on the elections, but the challenges remain huge. The high number of killed prospective candidates bodes ill for the campaign, suggesting that the decade-old trend of decreasing electoral violence could be reversed. There are substantial risks that a variety of additional means, including intimidation and illegal money, will be used to influence outcomes. The government must rigorously implement additional measures to protect candidates and shield the electoral process against criminal infiltration, corruption and fraud. Failure to mitigate these risks would mean in many places four more years of poor local governance, high levels of corruption and enduring violence. Decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the tasks and the resources of local government, but in many municipalities, capabilities failed to keep pace. This mismatch made local governments increasingly attractive targets for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Violence against candidates, local office holders and political and social activists soared. With a largely hostile attitude to local governments, guerrillas have mainly concentrated on sabotaging and disturbing the electoral process. By contrast, paramilitary groups, particularly after the formation of a national structure under the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), used their links with economic and political elites to infiltrate local governments and capture public resources. That peaked in the 2003 local elections. Since then, and particularly after the official demobilisation of these groups in 2006, the influence politicians linked to paramilitaries enjoyed has weakened but not disappeared. The October elections are the first test of how democratic institutions under the government of President Juan Manuel Santos cope with the growing power of new illegal armed groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs), now acknowledged as the country’s biggest security threat. These organisations, which the government calls BACRIM (criminal gangs), are unlikely to have a unified stance towards the elections. Some will be content with minimal relations to local politics to guarantee their impunity, access to information and freedom of action. But NIAGs are rapidly evolving into larger, more robust criminal networks, so some could develop a more ambitious political agenda. Several advocates of land restitution for the victims of Colombia’s long-running armed conflict already have been assassinated, suggesting that this major Santos initiative is likely to be met by alliances between criminals and some segments of local economic elites, in defence of the status quo. Meanwhile, frequent attacks against prospective candidates and civilians suggest that the weakened FARC wants to prove it is not a spent force. Colombia is better prepared than in the past to take on these challenges. Impunity is decreasing, as judicial investigations into links between politicians and paramilitaries have resulted in the conviction of some two dozen members of Congress. Investigations and indictments are now moving down to the local government level, albeit slowly and unevenly. In July 2011, the government signed into law a far-ranging political reform, paving the way for the imposition of penalties on parties that endorse candidates with links to illegal armed groups or face investigation for drug trafficking and crimes against humanity. Election financing rules and anti-corruption norms have also been stiffened, although shortcomings in the legal framework remain. Over the long term, these changes should favour more competitive and cleaner local elections, but in the short term, their impact will, for a number of reasons, be limited. The approval of the political reform law less than four months ahead of the elections has heightened uncertainty, and time is running short to apply some of the innovations. More broadly, political parties remain weak, and there are doubts whether they can even effectively determine their own nominees in all cases. Meaningful competition is unlikely to emerge in regions where the political and economic environment is heavily biased towards elites formerly linked to paramilitaries. Clientelism continues to be a drag on local politics, while links between criminals and politicians are frequently difficult to expose because of deep-seated popular mistrust of unresponsive local authorities. Guaranteeing the conditions for free, fair and competitive elections remains the dominant immediate challenge for the government. But more needs to be done to protect local government from the influence of illegal armed groups over the long term. The National Electoral Council (CNE) must be strengthened and become more independent. Congress needs to update and simplify Colombia’s diverse electoral rules. Political parties must establish stronger internal structures and develop a culture of accountability. These changes will ultimately be insufficient, however, if local government continues to lack the institutional capacities to guarantee democratic, clean and efficient management of its affairs. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 37: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Shelf Number: 122156 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Derks, Maria Title: A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia Summary: Colombia has stood at the forefront of debate across Latin America and the world on how chronic armed violence can be combated. Its programmes of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have aimed to put over 50,000 ex-combatants from paramilitary forces and guerrilla movements back into civilian life. But a rising tide of criminal violence has swept up former paramilitary fighters and is seizing control of Colombia’s many sources of illicit wealth, with cocaine production and trafficking at their heart. While thousands are still enrolled in reintegration courses, this paper asks what more the Colombian government, civil society and the international community can do to ensure that the demobilization process does not end in failure. The paper, based on extensive field research, argues that an essential first step is to ensure local communities are engaged, respected and protected. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael', 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2011 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/news/2011/20110707_a_community_dilemma_ddr_and_the_changing_face_of_violence_in_colombia.html Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/news/2011/20110707_a_community_dilemma_ddr_and_the_changing_face_of_violence_in_colombia.html Shelf Number: 123489 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingParamilitary GroupsViolence (Colombia)Violent Crime |
Author: Vallejo, Catalina Title: Iron fist politics in Colombia: A panorama of destruction Summary: During the last decade many Latin American countries have resorted to mano dura (iron fist) politics and militarisation to combat crime, drugs and subversion. The high number of killed, injured and displaced persons in Colombia is a testimony of the failure of the iron fist policy with regard to in a crucial aspect of security: developing cultures of respect. When making policy in response to illegal groups’ violence, does using the same violent strategy allow for constructive social engagement? Does it break cycles of violence? While the villains’ death makes for a peaceful ending in comic books, in Latin America it reproduces violence. It is urgent to reimagine heroism and restore “enemies” their human dignity. Details: Bergen, Norway: CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), 2011. 4p. Source: CMI Brief, Volume 11 No. 1: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Shelf Number: 123886 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical CorruptionViolence (Colombia) |
Author: Dube, Oeindrila Title: Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia Summary: States facing internal conflict often receive military assistance from the United States, but the relationship between such assistance and state capacity is not well known. In this working paper, post-doctoral fellow Oeindrila Dube and co-author Suresh Naidu offer new research on the links between military assistance and political violence. They find that increased U.S. military aid to Colombia, a haven for narcotics trafficking long-plagued by guerrilla warfare, increases paramilitary violence but has no effect on guerilla violence. With significant implications for U.S. policy in weak and conflict-ridden states, the evidence indicates that the effectiveness of military aid, which is intended to bolster the weak state against violent groups, is undercut by collusion between the military and illegal armed groups. Further, the authors expose that this collusion means that foreign assistance directly enables illegal groups to perpetuate political violence and undermine democratic institutions, such as electoral participation. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 197: Accessed May 14, 2014 at: http://www.cgdev.org/publication/bases-bullets-and-ballots-effect-us-military-aid-political-conflict-colombia-working Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1423498_file_Dube_Naidu_Military_Aid_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 132346 Keywords: Military Aid Paramilitary GroupsPolitical Violence Violence (Colombia) |
Author: International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Title: Colombia. The War is Measured in Litres of Blood Summary: Colombia has been enduring an internal armed conflict for fifty years. In the conflict members of insurgent groups (guerrillas) have clashed with the National Army and paramilitary groups. Under these conditions, serious human rights violations and international crimes have been committed. Since November 1, 2002, Colombia is party to the Rome Statute, setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to the principle of complementarity established by that statute, Colombia is obliged to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the crimes considered therein, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ICC went into operation in July 2002, when its Statute went into effect. Since ICC General Prosecutor took office in June, 2003 Colombia has been under "preliminary analysis", but this was made public only in 2006. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and one of its member organizations in Colombia, the Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective (CAJAR), have been working in research, advocacy, and support for victims of international crimes before the ICC since 2005. According to article 15 of the Rome Statute, interested parties (victims, non-governmental organizations, etc.) may submit to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor statements indicating crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. The FIDH and the CAJAR have submitted twelve communications of this kind to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor since June 2005. During this period the FIDH and the CAJAR were engaged in dialogue with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor and they continue to do so. This communication and careful monitoring of the policy of the Prosecutor's Office with regard to the situations under preliminary analysis and particularly the situation in Colombia, has enabled the FIDH to monitor the evolution of the analysis carried out by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor. One of the observations that has emerged repeatedly during the dialogue between the FIDH and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has been the need to identify the highest-level people responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Colombia which are under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is appropriate to recall here that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has made the investigation and prosecution of top commanders a key element of its policy. This is the context in which the FIDH transmitted this report to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor along with two confidential attachments which identify those most responsible. The preliminary analysis is governed by article 53, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute. In accordance with this provision, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor carries out analysis in three stages and in the following order: first, it must be determined whether crimes within the competence of the ICC have been committed; second, an analysis of admissibility is carried out, including analysis of the gravity of the phenomenon and the test of complementarity; finally, it is determined whether an investigation is in the interests of justice in the particular case. Details: Paris: FIDH, 2012. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapp_colombie__juin_2012_anglais_def.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 132475 Keywords: Criminal ProsecutionExtrajudicial Executions (Colombia)GuerrillasHuman RightsParamilitary GroupsViolence |
Author: Moor, Marianne Title: The Dark Side of Coal: Paramilitary Violence in the Mining Region of Cesar, Colombia Summary: PAX Netherlands - the Dutch section of Pax Christi International - is calling on Essent, Nuon, E.ON, Delta and Electrabel to stop buying Colombian "blood coal" from the mining companies Drummond and Prodeco. These mining companies must first contribute to the acknowledgment and compensation of the thousands of victims of paramilitary violence around their mines in the 1996-2006 period, and actively oppose the current human rights abuses. Drummond and Prodeco paid the paramilitaries and exchanged strategic information with them, according to statements from perpetrators and witnesses in the investigation report "The Dark Side of Coal", which PAX presented today, 30 June 2014, to the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, Lilianne Ploumen. Between 1996 and 2006 paramilitaries murdered a total of 3100 people and drove 55,000 farmers from their land. The victims have never received compensation or acknowledgment. To this day the mining companies benefit from these gross human rights abuses. Some of the land that was seized is within the companies' territory. The trade union has been systematically weakened by lethal violence; any critics have been silenced by threats. Perpetrators and witnesses say the collaboration between the coal mining companies and the paramilitaries in the Colombian department of Cesar consisted of financial and material support and the exchange of strategic information. The main focus of the investigation "The Dark Side of Coal" is Drummond. There are fewer sources for Prodeco's involvement, but the information available warrants further investigation. "The Dark Side of Coal" presents previously unreported testimonies of perpetrators and victims, and is the first systematic investigation into the abuses surrounding the coal mines in Cesar. Details: Utrecht: PAX, The Netherlands, 2014. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://actie.paxvoorvrede.nl/actie/stop-bloedkolen/ Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://actie.paxvoorvrede.nl/actie/stop-bloedkolen/ Shelf Number: 133255 Keywords: Coal MiningHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesNatural Resources (Colombia)Paramilitary GroupsViolence |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: State of Fear: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Killings Summary: Gambia's human rights record is among the worst in African. Since taking power over two decades ago, President Yaya Jammeh has ruthlessly suppressed dissent, shutdown virtually all independent media, and has routinely cracked down on journalists, opposition members, rights activists, student leaders, religious leaders, relatives of alleged coup plotters, and civil servants. Since 2014 when the Jammeh administration introduced anti-gay legislation which imposes a life sentence for a series of new "aggravated homosexuality" offenses, state security forces have targeted lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people with a wave of arrests and detentions. State of Fear, based on two research trips to Senegal and Gambia and more than 60 interviews, including with victims, witnesses and perpetrators of abuses, documents numerous violations allegedly perpetrated by Gambia's security forces, intelligence agents and a paramilitary group. These include extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests and detentions. Many of these violations appear to be used by the authorities to instill fear in the population, which, together with a judicial system lacking independence, prevents victims and family members from seeking justice. The government has systematically failed to protect its own citizens and neglected to hold accountable those responsible for serious abuses. Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Gambia to urgently investigate and prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses, disarm and disband paramilitary groups, and ensure security forces respect the due process rights of all individuals. The government should also implement key recommendations from both the United Nations Human Rights Council's 20th Universal Periodic Review of Gambia and the 2015 reports of the UN Special Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial executions. Details: New York: HRW, 2015. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2015 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/gambia0915_4up.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/gambia0915_4up.pdf Shelf Number: 136806 Keywords: Arbitrary ArrestsExtrajudicial ExecutionsHuman Rights AbusesParamilitary GroupsTorture |
Author: Porteux, Jonson Nathaniel Title: Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters: The Processes of State Building in Korea Summary: This dissertation seeks to understand why developed democracies with high state capacity tolerate, and in some cases cooperate with criminal organizations such as paramilitaries, mafia organizations, and vigilantes. The symbiotic relationship between these groups is surprisingly common, but it blurs the lines between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence and allows political actors to circumvent democratic checks on state authority. While previous research has linked illicit violence to weak or failing states, my study is unique in its empirical and theoretical focus on both economically and politically developed governments. It is argued that state monopoly over the use of violence purposefully varies. Political actors must continually exercise their authority in the face of both resource and politically driven constraints in the complex processes of state building, and state maintaining. In the face of resource constraints, political actors sub-contract violence in order to extend their reach and expand their forces. Sub-contracting as a result of principally politically driven constraints however, serves two goals beyond an expansion of forces. First, it allows political actors to distance themselves from police actions deemed illiberal-and hence unpopular-by society. Second, because criminal groups are extra-legal organizations, subcontracting allows the state to avoid transparency and accountability constraints. The choice to subcontract is thus conditioned not only by the end goal, but also by social pressures regarding appropriate means to bring about preferred outcomes. Importantly, the political payoffs from subcontracting are high in states with high levels of operational capacity, as they can best manage the potential risk that criminal groups metastasize and challenge state authority directly. Unbiased, quantifiable data on the linkage between state actors and illicit organizations are-largely by design-impossible to obtain. My primary analysis is based on a year of fieldwork in South Korea, utilizing evidence gleaned from interviews with the police, prosecutors, journalists, mafia members, and victims. Details: Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2013. 218p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/102333/jporteux_1.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Korea, South URL: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/102333/jporteux_1.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 138588 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsCriminal ViolenceOrganized CrimeParamilitary Groups |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Unchecked Power: Police and Military Raids in Low-Income and Immigrant Communities in Venezuela Summary: Since July 2015, Venezuelan security forces have conducted more than 135 operations, including sweeps through low-income communities, as part of the "Operation to Liberate and Protect the People" (OLP), with the alleged purpose of combatting criminal gangs that contribute to the extremely high levels of violence in Venezuela. Participating security forces have included the Bolivarian National Guard, the Bolivarian National Police, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigative Police, and state police forces. Unchecked Power: Police and Military Raids in Low-Income and Immigrant Communities in Venezuela describes considerable evidence that security forces conducting OLP raids have committed serious abuses. In interviews with the Venezuelan Human Rights Education-Action Program (PROVEA) and Human Rights Watch, victims, witnesses, and other interlocutors described violations including extrajudicial killings and other violent abuses, arbitrary detentions, forced evictions, the destruction of hundreds of homes, and the arbitrary deportation of Colombian nationals including refugees and asylum seekers, often accused without evidence of having links to "paramilitaries." A common denominator shared by these cases, and by government abuses we have documented in other contexts during the past decade, is the extent to which the victims-or their families-have been unable to challenge alleged abuses of state power, feeling they have nowhere to turn for protection of their fundamental rights. The government of Venezuela should ensure that all OLP operations are carried out in accordance with its international human rights obligations, including the requirement to refrain from using unlawful force during public security operations. Ultimately, a strong, independent judiciary is essential to ensure accountability and redress for the kinds of abuses alleged in this report-and to prevent such abuses in the future. PROVEA and Human Rights Watch call on President Nicolas Maduro, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court to take urgent steps to restore the judiciary's role as an independent guarantor of fundamental rights, and on the international community to press Venezuela's government to stop undermining the impartiality and independence of the judicial branch. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/venezuela0416web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Venezuela URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/venezuela0416web.pdf Shelf Number: 138591 Keywords: GangsHuman Rights AbusesParamilitary GroupsPolice BrutalityPolice Use of ForceViolence |
Author: Sanchez, Nelson Camilo Title: Cuentas claras: El papel de la Comision de la Verdad en la develacion de la responsabilidad de empresas en el conflicto armado colombiano Summary: This report examines the relationship between private businesses and paramilitary groups during Colombia's decades-long armed conflict, arguing that a post-conflict truth commission should investigate these potentially criminal dealings. Details: Bogota, Colombia; Dejusticia: 2018. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 16, 2018 at: https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Cuentas-Claras.pdf?x54537 Year: 2018 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Cuentas-Claras.pdf?x54537 Shelf Number: 149492 Keywords: Economic CrimesHuman RightsParamilitary Groups |
Author: McGovern, Tara Alexandra Title: New Armed Groups in Colombia: The Emergence of the Bacrim in the 21st Century Summary: The 2003-2006 paramilitary demobilization in Colombia created major public policy challenges for the government, including the emergence of new illegal groups (Bacrim or bandas criminales). To date, there is no agreement between the government, academicians, and non-governmental organizations about the nature of these bacrim. The lack of shared understanding inhibits the establishment of a comprehensive plan to combat the bacrim and does a disservice to prior demobilization efforts. If these groups are legitimate participants in the on-going conflict, members will reap economic and legal benefits; otherwise, they will face criminal consequences. In this dissertation, I used an embedded case study of five major bacrim (Las Aguilas Negras, ERPAC, Los Paisas, Los Rastrojos, and Los Urabenos) to examine their origins and leadership, members and structure, ideology and activities, and territory. I developed a comparative framework to identify key characteristics of paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and new types of organized crime. I also developed a supporting quantitative analysis of crime statistics and public opinion surveys. The case study revealed heterogeneity across all five groups, calling into question the utility of the umbrella term bacrim. The quantitative research showed a substantial postdemobilization decline in homicides and other violent crimes but steady and/or increasing extortion and corruption. Identifying and ameliorating long-standing social and economic problems, in addition to developing strategies for individual groups, will do more to support peace in Colombia than focusing on short-term homogeneous approaches to the bacrim, such as kingpin removal. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2016. 357p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 17, 2018 at: http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/10611/McGovern_gmu_0883E_11303.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/10611/McGovern_gmu_0883E_11303.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 151161 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsHomicidesOrganized CrimeParamilitary GroupsViolent Crime |